A Unifying Framework For Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Secure Communication Protocols
Many networking protocols have been designed without security in mind, and many cryptographic schemes have been designed without practical deployments in mind. Moreover, most of security-enhanced communication protocols still lack the provable-security treatment and hence the security guarantees. This project aims at bridging the gap between protocol design, implementation, deployment, and security guarantees by developing a novel general security framework that facilitates the provable-security analyses of practical networking protocols. The project has an interdisciplinary approach as it combines concepts from applied cryptography and algorithms with implementation and empirical analyses to provide a unifying framework for studying and developing secure communication protocols. This joint design effort yields both new cryptographic foundations and fundamentally secure networking protocols.
How Secure and Quick is QUIC? Provable Security and Performance Analyses
Robert Lychev, Samuel Jero, Alexandra Boldyreva, and Cristina Nita-Rotaru. 36th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland), May 2015. [PDF] [BIBTEX] [VIDEO]|
Awarded the 2016 IETF/IRTF Applied Networking Research Prize
- Samuel Jero, Purdue University
- Robert Lychev, Georgia Institute of Technology
This project is funded by NSF SaTC grant 1421815-CNS. Principal Investigator: Cristina Nita-Rotaru (Purdue University) This is a collaboration with Alexandra Boldyreva, Georgia Institute of Technology.